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Abstract
Theories of both distributive (Adams, 1963) and procedural justice 
(Thibaut & Walker, 1975) have been demonstrated to be accurate in 
describing subjective evaluations of fairness in a wide variety of 
circumstances. However, a phenomenon known as the frustration 
effect (e.g. Folger, 1977) results in perceptions of fairness that 
are incongruent with the predictions of these two theories. This 
study attempts to explain the discrepant results in terms of 
attribution theory as it was proposed by Weiner (1985). By 
manipulating and measuring the attributions made by subjects, the 
attributional explanation was tested. The results of this 
experiment were not supportive of this theoretical perspective, 
but several methodological factors may have hampered this attempt. 
The results and methodological difficulties encountered in this 
experiment are discussed in terms of their implications for future 
studies of the frustration effect.
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1Perceptions of Fairness in the Frustration Effect:
An Attributional Analysis
Previous research has demonstrated that perceptions of
fairness have a significant impact on the efficient functioning of
and satisfaction with organizational and societal institutions
(Folger & Greenberg, 1985; Friedland, Thibaut, & Walker, 1973;
Thibaut, Friedland, & Walker, 1974; Tyler, 1987). These fairness
evaluations are influenced by two different factors: the equity of
the outcomes (distributive justice) and the appropriateness of the
procedures that are used in arriving at these outcomes (procedural
justice). While more equitable outcomes and more appropriate 
*
procedures normally result in increased evaluations of fairness, 
sometimes this combination actually results in lower evaluations 
of fairness (see Lind & Tyler, 1988, p. 180). Attempts to explain 
these divergent results have not netted an all-encompassing 
explanation of these varying perceptions of fairness. The 
following is a recapitulation of the research associated with 
psychological reactions to fairness, and a presentation of recent 
research that provides new insight into factors that may moderate 
the effect of the outcomes and procedures on perceptions of 
fairness.
Distributive Fairness
Historically, much of the research that dealt with the issue 
of fairness focused on the appropriateness of varying outcome 
levels for different individuals. Adam's (1963) formulation of
equity theory highlighted the importance of both inputs and 
outcomes as the basis for judging the fairness of differing 
allocation decisions. Inputs are defined as the perceived 
contributions of a person into a system or relationship. Outcomes 
are the things the person' receives from the relationship or 
system. Within the framework of this theory, individuals evaluate 
their input/outcome ratio against the input/outcome ratio of a 
social referent. The system is fair when the ratio of inputs and 
outcomes for the two individuals is equal.
Equity theory suggests that people utilize a model of 
fairness which focuses on the purely distributive dimension, 
looking only at relative inputs and outcomes to determine whether 
or not justice has been served. With such a narrow focus, equity 
theory does not take into account the procedures by which outcomes 
are decided (Folger, 1986b). If an evaluation of the procedures 
did not take place and equity were the sole basis on which 
fairness was determined, each situation might require an analysis 
of the relative inputs and outcomes of each individual to 
determine whether everyone was being treated equitably. If this 
were the case, the evaluations would require a vast amount of 
information to be assimilated and, as such, would be an extremely 
inefficient way to evaluate fairness.
Procedural Fairness
In what has become a monumental series of studies in justice ' 
research, Thibaut and Walker (1975) studied the importance of
3outcome decision procedures on perceptions of fairness. By 
manipulating both the outcomes received and the process by which 
the outcomes were determined, they demonstrated that procedures 
affect perceptions of fairness. Thus, in addition to evaluations 
of the input vs outcome ratios, the evaluation of procedures 
leading to outcome decisions is also an integral element of 
judgements of fairness.
with empirical evidence that evaluations of fairness occur on 
both procedural and distributive dimensions, subsequent research 
has routinely measured these dimensions independently. Evaluation 
of the fairness of procedures used to determine outcomes is 
labeled procedural justice (Thibaut & Walker, 1975), and 
evaluation of the fairness of outcomes is labeled distributive 
justice (Homans, 1961).
An illustration may prove useful in clarifying these two 
dimensions. Imagine that you have been wrongly accused of 
plagiarizing and have the option of either pleading guilty or 
defending yourself in front of a review board. After preparing a 
statement to defend your innocence, you show up on the morning of 
the hearing only to be told that the charge has been dismissed. 
This verdict was reached prior to any opportunity to make 
statements in your defense. Upon further inquiry, you find that 
accusations are routinely dropped for those who take the time to 
prepare a case. The logic presented is that you must be innocent 
if you took the time to prepare a case and are ready to present it
4to the board.
From a purely distributive standpoint, justice has been 
served; you have not been convicted of something of which you are 
innocent. If evaluations of fairness rested solely on this 
dimension, any skepticism about fairness could not be based on the 
actual outcome received. On the other hand, it is possible that a 
great deal of skepticism would follow procedures that resemble the 
above scenario. The procedures that were followed in determining 
your outcome, although leading to a verdict that happened to be 
correct, do not guarantee a just outcome will always be reached. 
Because no confidence in these procedures exist, the fairness of 
each outcome would have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 
Procedural Justice Effects
How does procedural justice affect perceptions of 
distributive justice? Several studies (La Tour, 1978; Lind, Kurtz, 
Musante, Walker, & Thibaut, 1980; Walker, LaTour, Lind, & Thibaut, 
1974) have analyzed this relationship by varying the procedures 
used and the outcomes received. Results indicate that fairer 
procedures resulted in higher ratings of distributive justice, 
even if the two different procedures resulted in identical 
outcomes. The bottom line of these experiments is that 
satisfaction with the outcomes was improved merely by using better 
procedures (Lind & Tyler, 1988). Increasing the outcomes, 
therefore, is not a prerequisite to improving perceptions of 
distributive justice.
5The implications of procedural fairness are best exemplified 
in two studies that contrasted the effects of varying procedures 
and outcomes. In a study of leadership endorsement, Tyler and 
Caine (1981) manipulated both outcomes and procedures and examined 
whether distributive or procedural fairness played a more 
important role in the support given to formal leaders (e.g. school 
teachers and politicians). While perceptions of distributive 
justice were important, perceptions of procedural justice 
accounted for a significantly greater percentage of the variance • 
in ratings of leadership support.
Tyler and Caine provided additional support for their 
findings in a field study examining these same variables. In this 
latter study, the impact of procedural factors was even more 
dramatic. The regression coefficients linking perceptions of 
distributive justice to leadership support for various political 
figures generally were not statistically significant. In 
contrast, the regression coefficients linking perceptions of 
procedural justice to leadership support were significant 
accounting for 11 to 22 percent of the variance.
It is also important to note that the impact of procedural 
justice is greatest in cases where individual outcomes are 
negative. Research associated with attribution theory has 
demonstrated that decisions having a personal impact make 
individuals sensitive to the process by which the decisions are 
made, especially when the outcomes are negative or unexpected
6(Weiner, 1985, 1986; Wong & Weiner, 1981). While, in general, 
studies have demonstrated that fairer procedures result in greater 
outcome satisfaction (Thibaut & Walker, 1975), the evaluations 
associated with negative outcomes should make subjects especially 
sensitive to the types of procedures used (Lind & Tyler, 1988,
p.186).
Empirical evidence exists supporting this hypothesis (Folger, 
1986a; Folger & Martin, 1986). When outcomes are negative, the 
legitimacy of the process leading to the outcomes must be 
maximized if perceptions of justice are to be maintained (Bies, 
1987). When the procedures are perceived to be fair, the system 
enjoys a cushion of support (Greenberg & Folger, 1983; Lind & 
Tyler, 1988, p.67), even in the face of negative outcomes. 
Investigating what factors contribute to the cushion of support is 
at the center of much of the procedural and distributive justice 
research.
Voice
By implementing a remarkably simple procedure called voice, 
the cushion of support is normally attained. This procedure 
involves allowing individuals the opportunity to express their 
opinion or concerns in an effort to influence a decision in which 
they have an interest (Greenberg & Folger, 1983). Simply 
providing interested individuals with an opportunity for voice 
improves their perceptions of procedural justice (Thibaut &
Walker, 1975). This improvement is labeled the fair process
7effect (Greenberg & Folger, 1983).
The original definition proposed by Greenberg and Folger 
(1983) implies that influence over the outcomes is important if 
perceptions of procedural justice are to be enhanced. Recent 
evidence indicates that the perception of influence over the 
outcome may not be that important.
Components of Voice
For purposes of studying the effect of voice on perceptions 
of fairness, a distinction has been made between voice which is 
merely expressive and that which is instrumental (Tyler, Rasinski, 
& Spodick, 1985), The expressive value of voice is nothing more 
than being able to express an opinion regardless of its perceived 
effect on the-outcomes. In contrast, the instrumental value of 
voice is linked to the perception that expression will somehow 
lead to a fairer outcome (Thibaut & Walker, 1975).
while it has been demonstrated that the instrumental aspect 
of voice is important (Tyler et al., 1985), the value expressive 
component also affects perceptions of fairness (Earley, 1984; 
Earley & Lind, 1987; Tyler 1987, 1989). Just being allowed the 
opportunity to express an opinion has value over and above the 
perception of how much influence.voice has on those outcomes.
In fact, the value expressive component of voice is so 
important that even in situations where it is clear that 
expressing an opinion will have no impact on the outcomes, ratings 
of procedural justice still improve compared to situations in
which voice is not allowed (Earley, 1984). In a study testing 
this effect, subjects were told that their outcomes were already 
decided and the decision was final. Nonetheless, subjects were 
given an opportunity to express their opinion after the outcomes 
had been announced, even though they knew their expressions .would 
not alter the decision. With clear evidence that their voice did 
not represent an opportunity to influence the outcomes, subjects 
given voice still rated the procedures as more fair than did 
subjects who were not provided the opportunity for voice.
In contrast to earlier definitions of voice as an attempt to 
influence outcomes (Greenberg & Folger, 1983), the value 
expressive component appears to be a significant factor in the 
effect voice has on perceptions of fairness. Regardless of what 
factors contribute to increases in perceptions of fairness, the 
fair process effect associated with voice is one of the more 
robust findings in the domain of justice research (Lind & Tyler, 
1988, p.179).
Referent Cognition Theory
In an effort to integrate the research on distributive and 
procedural justice, Folger (1986b; Folger & Martin, 1986) 
formulated referent cognition theory. This theory encompasses 
both distributive and procedural justice. From a distributive 
justice standpoint, it is suggested that outcomes are evaluated on 
how closely they resemble the evaluator's perceptions of an 
equitable solution. In the same manner, the procedures are
9evaluated against what is perceived as the most appropriate 
procedure for the given situation. As the actual outcomes and 
procedures more closely approximate the perceptions of that which 
is fairest, referent cognition theory predicts that judgements of 
fairness will increase.
This model suggests that the two dimensions make independent, 
additive contributions to evaluations of fairness. If this is 
correct, situations in which the procedures are held constant and 
the outcomes are changed so they become more equitable should 
result in higher fairness evaluations than situations in which the 
initially inequitable outcomes are unchanged. The same overt 
procedures are maintained; thus, according to referent cognition 
theory, there should be no differential contribution from the 
actual procedures employed to the perceived fairness of the 
outcomes. From a distributive justice perspective, the change to 
more equitable outcomes should result in improved evaluations of 
fairness.
In fact, enhancement of procedural and distributive fairness 
occurs when an initial inequity is corrected to meet the 
evaluator's perception of equity (deCarufel & Schopler, 1979; 
Folger,.1977). However, in order for perceptions of fairness to 
improve it is important that the outcome increment closely 
resemble that which the evaluator thinks is fair. If voice is 
allowed, evaluations of fairness do not rise with outcome 
improvement if the outcome improvement is negligible. This
10
relationship between outcome and desired outcome is only important 
when the procedures allow for expression of voice (Folger, 1977). 
When voice is not allowed and a slight improvement in outcomes 
occurs, perceptions of fairness become a function of objective 
outcome equity.
Frustration Effect
When voice is allowed but outcomes are not improved to an 
equitable level, the cushion of support and the fair process 
effect normally associated with voice procedures do not occur 
(Conlon, Lind, & Lissak, 1989; deCarufel & Schopler, 1979; Folger, 
1977). Not only do the perceptions of procedural and distributive 
justice not improve with the fairer outcomes, they actually 
decrease as compared to situations where the originally 
inequitable outcomes remain unaltered. The perception of fairness 
in this situation is also lower than if the outcomes were, improved 
without the opportunity for voice. This phenomenon has been 
labeled the frustration effect (Folger, 1977), a label which has 
been attached to situations in which perceptions of fairness do 
not improve as would be expected given improvements in outcomes or 
the use of more appropriate procedures.
The first and most frequently cited study of the frustration 
effect was conducted by Folger (1977). In this experiment, fifth 
grade boys were asked to perform zip code sorting tasks for which 
they received varying levels of reimbursement as determined by 
another subject who was selected to play the role of manager. The
11
amount of reimbursement came from a fixed amount of money to be 
distributed between the manager and the worker%
Prior to task performance, subjects were asked to write on a 
fair payment card the proportion of each allocation they thought 
would represent the fairest distribution. The experimenter 
explained that since the worker and manager were randomly assigned 
to their positions, an even split of the money was usually deemed 
the most appropriate. As would be expected, almost all subjects 
indicated the equal division of outcomes was fair. The fair 
payment cards were used as the mode of voice. Subjects in the 
voice condition were told the manager was given the card to read 
after their second task performance session. Those in the mute 
condition filled out the cards, but were never told the manager 
would read what they had written.
In addition to the procedural manipulation of voice, the 
outcomes were manipulated so either the cumulative total 
compensation for the manager and worker were equal, or the 
cumulative total compensation for the worker was half of the 
manager's compensation. The allocations were set up on a schedule 
whereby half of the subjects' outcomes remained constant for each 
of the ten tasks, while the other outcomes became more equitable 
for each successive task performance. Thus, other than the voice 
vs mute condition, four additional situations existed in this 
experiment: constant, total equity; constant, total inequity; 
improving, total equity; and improving, total inequity.
12
Ratings on three categories of dependent variables were 
taken: managerial fairness, procedural fairness ("How fair was it 
to let your manager divide the money?"), and distributive 
fairness. As could be expected, conditions in which total 
cumulative equity existed between the worker's and manager's 
outcomes resulted in high ratings of managerial and distributive 
fairness. These particular results are consistent with referent 
cognitions theory, and are not specifically applicable to the 
frustration effect.
As would be expected on the basis of an independent 
evaluation of the procedures or outcomes, subjects in the mute- 
constant, total inequity condition rated the manager and 
distributions as less fair than did those who were in the voice- 
constant, total inequity or mute-improving, total inequity 
conditions. Subjects in the voice-improving, total inequity 
condition rated managerial and distributive fairness lower than 
those who were in either the voice-constant, total inequity or the 
mute-improving, total inequity conditions. Given the use of 
voice, which is a fairer procedure, and the improvement in 
outcomes, it would' be expected that these ratings would have been 
higher. Focusing only on the conditions where voice was 
contrasted with a mute condition and outcomes were either 
improving or remained the same, an interaction occurred in the 
voice-improving outcomes condition but not in the direction 
predicted based on the improving outcomes and the use of fairer
13
procedures.
Measures assessing how fair it was to allow the manager to 
make the allocation decisions did not reveal the same pattern. 
Instead, ratings of fairness were higher for the voice than the 
mute procedures, and higher for outcome improvement than the 
outcome constant conditions. It appears that since it was the
experimenter who set up the system providing the expression of
\
voice, these ratings varied as a function of procedures 
irrespective of whether or not the manager utilized voice 
information. For subjects in the voice-improving, total inequity 
condition the manager is attributed with responsibility for the 
decision, as is evidenced by the differential ratings between 
managerial and, what is for this study, procedural justice.
These lower fairness judgements in situations of increased 
equity have been .replicated elsewhere. deCarufel and Schopler 
(1979) asked subjects to perform a clerical task for which they 
perceived they would be compensated at a rate determined by a 
second subject. In reality, the outcome schedule was set up with 
the total cumulative outcome for each worker always equal to half 
that of the allocator.
Schedules of payment varied for each condition. Subjects in 
a constant condition received approximately the same inequitable 
proportion of the outcomes through each of the ten trials. Those 
in the equality condition received less than the allocator for the 
first five trials, but for the second set of five trials the
14
worker and allocator each received equal payments. Finally, those 
in the compensation condition received less than the allocator in 
the first five trials, but more than the allocator for the five 
remaining trials.
The procedures were manipulated by providing three types of 
voice after the fifth trial-. Subjects in the voice conditions
i
were allowed to pick out one of three cards that expressed either: 
(1) satisfaction with the allocations, and the allocator should 
keep more; (2) satisfaction with the allocations, and they should 
remain the same; or (3) dissatisfaction with the allocations, and 
the worker should receive more. In addition, the tone of the 
cards was altered; subjects were provided cards that either 
appealed to the allocator's sense of justice, or contained a 
threat suggesting that the worker would get even. The threat and 
appeal conditions were constrasted with a mute condition in which 
subjects had no opportunity to convey a message to the allocator.
The first unique finding of this study, inconsistent with 
previous research, is that subjects in the,voice conditions did 
not rate the procedures more fair as a result of voice. Because 
subjects were allowed to pick only one card which they agreed with 
the most and were not allowed to relay any of their own views, it 
is possible that this voice manipulation lacks the value 
expressive component of voice which later research has addressed. 
The lack of a fair process effect in this experiment, while 
present even when using a highly constrained voice in the Folger
15
(1977) experiment, suggests that the content of voice may have 
affected the results of this study.
However, the pattern of fairness ratings seen in the appeal 
compensation condition, when contrasted to the appeal equity 
condition, is unique to this study. Subjects who received 
outcomes that were greater than that of the allocator in the last 
five trials rated satisfaction and fairness lower than subjects 
whose outcomes during the last five trials were equal to that of 
the allocator. This occurred even though subjects in the 
compensation condition would have reason to believe the allocator 
was trying to rectify previous inequities.
deCarufel and Schopler (1979) suggest the disparate ratings 
could be explained by differing perceptions of distributive 
justice. Subjects in the equality condition may have believed the 
allocator was suggesting a "from now on" split of the outcomes was 
fair. Only the outcomes received after the voice card was 
delivered were assessed for fairness. In contrast, those in the 
compensation condition may have believed the allocator was using 
the cumulative total as a basis on which to evaluate the fairness 
of the outcomes. Thus, all the outcomes were assessed for 
fairness.
With the discrepant cumulative totals between the worker and 
the allocator, this explanation would appear plausible. Subjects 
in the equitable condition may have viewed the allocator as using 
a standard of justice involving a "from now on" approach; thus,
16
the fact that each subsequent allocation was equitable conformed 
to the "from now on" standard. In contrast, those in the 
compensation condition may have viewed the allocator as using 
total outcomes as the standard of justice. When subjects faced 
total outcomes that were not equitable, they felt the total 
outcome standard was violated, and the ratings of fairness 
reflected that fact.
This same pattern of results was not replicated in the threat
conditions. Again, this may link back to the value expressive
component of voice. The tone of the card, whether threat or
appeal, may have affected whether subjects felt the card
represented their own voice. With subsequent research
demonstrating the importance of the value expressive component of
voice, those in the threat condition may not have perceived that 
/
the card reflected their own position. For those in the appeal 
conditions, the card may have more closely represented their own 
views. As other factors were held constant, it would seem logical 
that the divergent ratings are an artifact of the nature of the 
voice.
These studies have involved the worker and the allocator in a 
non-correspondent relationship (Lind & Tyler, 1988); the allocator 
sacrifices what is given to the worker. As a result of this it 
could be suggested that this type of worker/manager non­
correspondence may be a prerequisite to the frustration effect. 
However, recent evidence suggests that this need not be the case.
17
In a situation where subjects were deprived of varying 
amounts of their rightful earnings from a business game/ a pattern 
of fairness ratings was exhibited that matched that of the 
frustration effect (Conlon et al., 1989). The difference in this 
study was that subjects no longer perceived the judge to have any 
interest in the outcomes other than a fair resolution of the 
conflict.
Each subject directed a group of individuals which had won a 
monetary prize in a business simulation game. After being told 
they had won, they were informed their winnings were in jeopardy 
because another group alleged they had violated one of the 
established rules of the game.
A mock trial was arranged with subjects represented by a law 
school student who presented their defense to a judge. After the 
judge heard the case, they were informed that either they had lost 
the case and would lose one-third, two-thirds, or all of their 
winnings, or they had won and could keep all of the total prize 
money.
Similar to the pattern of ratings seen in the Folger (1977) 
study, the fairness of the judge and procedures did not vary in a 
simple linear fashion with the amount of the money they were 
allowed to keep. Subjects who were allowed to keep only one-third 
of their winnings rated the procedures as significantly less fair 
than those who were deprived of all their outcomes.
Unique to this study was the fact that there were no
18
constraints placed on voice; yet, the frustration effect still 
occurred. The previous frustration effect studies have placed 
tight constraints on voice, which has caused some to suggest that 
this is a prerequisite to the frustration phenomenon (Lind &
Tyler, 1988, p.183). Because subjects were active participants in 
forming their own defense and felt they were well represented by 
their lawyers, the necessity of a constrained voice does not 
appear to be a valid prerequisite to the frustration effect.
Because the frustration effect has been used to describe 
decrements in fairness ratings resulting from a variety of 
situations, it is necessary to delineate a definition which 
clarifies the phenomenon of interest. For this study, the 
frustration effect will be defined as low evaluations of fairness 
in situations where the■procedures used and outcomes received 
would be independently rated as more procedurally or 
distributively fair than the actual ratings reported. This 
represents an interaction between perceptions of the procedures 
and outcomes that is in the opposite direction of the expected 
main effect for both variables. This definition necessitates a 
contrast of ratings between situations where the frustration 
effect occurs and situations where the procedures are the same and 
the outcome is less equitable, or the procedures are less fair and 
the outcomes are equally equitable.
Utilizing this definition, two experiments that do not 
fulfill all of the criteria, but are repeatedly-referred to as
19
examples of the frustration effect, were reported by Folger,
.Rosenfield, Grove, and Corkran (1979). In these studies subjects 
were provided with two different procedures (voice vs mute) along 
with social information about a co-worker's perception of the 
equity of the outcomes. For all subjects the outcomes were ■ 
inequitable and did not change after voice.
Subjects were told their co-workers thought the outcomes were 
either equitable or inequitable, thus, agreeing or disagreeing 
with the subject's perception of inequity. When the co-worker's 
opinion was that the outcomes were inequitable, the ratings of 
fairness associated with the voice procedure were no higher than 
those associated with the mute procedure; and in the second study, 
the ratings of fairness with the voice procedure were even 
slightly lower. In contrast, when the subjects were led to 
believe that the co-worker's opinion was that the outcomes were 
equitable, the ratings of fairness reflected the normal fair- 
process effect associated with voice procedures.
These experiments Vary in two ways from previous studies of 
the frustration effect. First, the ratings of fairness with a 
voice procedure were not significantly lower than the ratings of 
fairness with the mute procedure. All of the previous frustration 
effects have resulted in a significantly lower ratings of fairness 
when higher ratings would be expected. Second, it is the use of 
social information (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978) which causes the 
ratings to differ from the normal pattern. The previously cited
20
experiments have manipulated perceptions of fairness using a 
combination of procedures and outcomes. As reflected in the 
conclusion reached by Folger et al. (1979), "when supportive 
social 'evidence' is available, the fairness of the allocation 
procedure becomes essentially irrelevant" (p. 2259). While social 
information is important, the focus of the present research is to 
investigate the role of procedures and outcomes in producing the 
frustration effect.
Frustration Effect Explanations
Explanations of the frustration effect in the other 
experiments have resulted in no clear cut understanding of its 
cause. Folger (1977) suggested that those in situations where 
they receive improvements in outcomes after voice say to 
themselves, "I could have done better," whereas, those who receive 
improvements in outcomes without voice say, "I could have done 
worse."
Relative to those in the mute group, those who were given the 
opportunity for voice would have perceived that they were 
successful in influencing the manager. Folger suggests that this 
perception of success would lead to a higher standard of 
evaluation resulting in the "I could have done better 
perspective." Those in the mute group simply were at the mercy of 
the manager, when the outcomes spontaneously improved, it 
represented good luck- rather than something that could be 
expected.
.21
Similar to the explanation provided for the deCarufel and 
Schopler (1979) study, subjects could have used a different 
comparison level (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) to judge their outcomes, 
when voice is allowed, those who are in the no-improvement 
condition accept their stable outcomes as just, whereas, those.in- 
the outcome improvement condition use an equal distribution of the 
outcomes as a basis for evaluating their outcomes. The different 
perspective could have resulted in either a sense of relief or 
disappointment which is manifested in the differing judgements of 
fairness.
These explanations, however, are weakened by the Conlon et 
al. (1989) findings in which all of the subjects conceivably would 
have used the same outcome standard because of their innocence in 
the case. If the ratings of fairness are a function of the 
comparison level, the perceived fairness of the outcomes should 
vary as a linear function of the amount of earnings retained. As 
reflected by the results of this study, this pattern of judgements 
was not exhibited, calling into question the validity of this 
explanation.
In the Conlon et al. study, assessment of the subject's 
perception of whether or not the judge gave due consideration to 
their position provides some insight into factors that contribute 
to the frustration effect. As subjects' perceptions of the 
fairness of procedures varied, so did perceptions of the amount of 
consideration given to their arguments. This suggests that
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fairness perceptions are not purely a function of the procedures 
or the outcomes. A personal evaluation of Lite amount of 
consideration given by the decision maker to subjects'' voiced 
statements was an integral component of the ratings of procedural 
justice in this study.
Because assessment of due consideration in the Conlon et al. 
study was correlational, it is not clear whether due consideration 
moderates perceptions of justice, or perceptions of justice 
moderate due consideration. It is clear, however, that 
attributions about the decision maker covary with perceptions of 
fairness.'
Attribution Theory
As stated earlier, research has demonstrated that causal 
attributions are routinely made in situations where failure or 
unexpected outcomes are experienced (Wong & Weiner, 198.1). A 
three-factor model of attribution theory has been developed and 
verified for a variety of social situations (Weiner, 1986; Weiner, 
Perry, & Magnusson, 1988). This model makes use of judgements of 
stability, controllability, and locus of causality interacting to 
determine emotional reactions to a variety of social situations.
Attributions of stability are defined as the stability of-the 
cause of an action by an actor. Weiner (1985) points out that 
perceptions of stability are important attributions which 
influence everything from parole decisions to decisions about 
whether to re-enter school. Previous research on perceptions of
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fairness have not measured causal stability.
Subjects provided with outcomes that change will realize that 
the reason for, or cause of, the outcome decision is unstable, 
whether the outcomes are changed because the decision maker took 
into account fluctuations in factors which affect the outcome, or 
the decision maker just had a change in attitude, the perception 
of causal stability will be lower. In contrast, when outcomes do 
not change, subjects are more likely to make an attribution of 
causal stability.
In either case, there is no evidence that attributions of 
causal stability moderate the anger experienced by individuals who 
are exposed to aversive outcomes. Although Weiner (1985) points 
out that parole decisions are based on attributions of this 
dimension, these decisions were tied to the anticipated re­
occurrence of crimes rather than the affective reaction of 
individuals making parole decisions. From a theoretical 
perspective,, attribution theory disregards perceptions of 
stability in explaining anger reactions, reactions which are 
assumed to be important in the frustration effect. The pertinent 
dimensions used to understand anger, along with their implications 
for the frustration effect, are locus of causality and 
controllability.
Locus of causality has been defined as whether the cause of 
an individual's behavior is perceived as external or internal to 
the actor (Weiner, 1985, 1986). Acts performed as a reaction to
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some contextual demand are labeled as having an external locus of 
causality. Acts which are interpreted to be a result of a 
personal characteristic of the actor are defined as having an 
internal locus of causality.
Controllability of the act also plays a significant role in 
moderating emotional .reactions. An act performed without the 
actor having control over the action is not likely to arouse the 
same type of reaction as when it is clear the actor did have some 
control. For example, a student who turns in a paper one day late 
is more likely to receive sympathy from an instructor if the 
reason is an unavoidable illness rather than a trip to the 
baseball park. With important implications for the frustration 
effect, acts which result in an internal locus of causality and 
are perceived to be controllable result in feelings of anger 
(Weiner, Graham, & Chandler, 1982).
Frustration Effect Attributions
The utility of attribution theory for the area of fairness 
perceptions lies in its ability to theoretically explain the 
frustration effect phenomenon. Subjects confronted with some 
improvements in outcomes after pleading their case to a decision 
maker make two important attributions. First, the decision maker 
clearly has control over the outcomes based on the outcome 
improvements after voice. If the allocator did not have control, 
no outcome changes would have taken place.
Second, the locus of causality for the allocation is noW more
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easily attributed to an internal cause. If the initial decision 
was based on some contextual factors, it would be unnecessary to 
heed the worker's voice and provide increased outcomes. Based on 
evidence that the initial allocations were not contextually based, 
the worker is more likely to perceive an internal locus of 
causality for the decision maker's behavior. In this case, 
outcomes that do not improve to equity will be perceived as caused 
by a personal characteristic of the actor, such as greed.
In contrast, those situations where the outcomes remain 
constant after voice provide no additional evidence that the 
decisionmaker has complete control over the outcomes. Had
outcomes been altered, then it would have been clear to those who
were receiving the outcomes that the decision maker did have
control over how much they received. Even though subjects in each
of the experiments were informed that the decision maker was in 
control, augmenting the perception of control by improving the 
outcomes may be an additional assault to further feelings of anger 
toward the decision maker (Kelley, 1972).
Similarly, subjects in a voice-no improvement condition lack 
further information on the locus of causality of the allocation. 
Having received no improvements in outcomes, subjects are likely 
to.perceive that the initial allocations are relatively fair 
because they are based on some contextual factors of which they 
are not aware. What was fair before the expression of voice is 
just as fair afterwards, thereby confirming any external
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attributions of causality for the decision maker's allocations. 
Subject-Allocator Relationship
An attribution perspective also sheds some light on the 
importance of the relationship between the decision maker and the 
subject. Given that the decision maker has an interest in the 
outcomes the subject receives in a non-correspondent relationship, 
a bias may exist toward perceiving that the allocations were 
influenced by an internal characteristic of the decision maker 
(i.e. a desire to keep as much of the allocation as possible). In 
contrast, in a judicial setting where the interest of the decision 
maker is perceived to be the resolution of a conflict, the bias 
toward an internal attribution of causality is not as strong, 
while the pattern of attributions in both cases may be relatively 
the same, the magnitude of the attributions should reflect these 
biases. This effect should also be manifested in evaluations of 
fairness.
It would seem that the. frustration effect would be magnified 
by the relationship between the subject and decision maker. In a 
non-correspondent relationship, evaluations of the fairness of 
procedures and outcomes should be lower than when the 
relationships are neutral. This relationship should have the 
greatest impact in situations where there is sufficient evidence, 
that the decision maker is not giving due consideration to the 
subject's perspective. It is in this context that the search for 
a cause should be the most important, and trust in the. decision
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maker should be the most suspect. Thus, the nature of the 
relationship should prove to be important.
Summary and Hypotheses
The theories surrounding perceptions of fairness have now 
advanced to include both distributive and procedural factors. It 
is the combination of these two dimensions that normally 
contribute to perceived fairness. Yet one situation elicits 
patterns of fairness ratings which are inconsistent with 
predictions made by theories of fairness. Recent theoretical 
advances made in attributional models of achievement motivation 
and emotion now provide new insights through which the frustration 
effect can be viewed.
The purpose of this research was to determine how well the 
attribution model explains the frustration effect. More 
specifically, an investigation was conducted on how attributions 
impact perceived fairness and lead to the frustration phenomenon 
in the context of voice. Again, previous research has identified 
the frustration effect only when individuals are provided voice 
(Lind & Tyler, 1988). As a result, this study examined the 
effects of attributions on fairness perceptions only as they 
occurred in the context of voice.
It is necessary to recall that the frustration effect is 
defined as lowered perceptions of fairness accompanying slight 
outcome improvements as compared to the perceptions of fairness 
that accompany less equitable, but unchanged outcomes. More
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equitable outcomes actually lead to the perception of less equity. 
Thus, the manipulation of outcome change is needed to study the 
variables believed to be responsible for the frustration effect.
As such, subjects were exposed to either outcomes that were held 
constant or outcomes that improved slightly after they were given 
an opportunity for voice.
In addition to manipulating outcomes, subjects were also 
exposed to one of three different levels of feedback information 
designed to impact their, attributions. The first level of the 
attribution manipulation was a partial replication of the previous 
frustration effect investigations. As in previous studies, some 
subjects were provided with outcomes that improved or stayed the 
same without receiving any additional attributional information. 
However, subjects in the second and third attribution levels were 
provided with attributional information designed to influence 
their evaluations' of fairness. Those in the second level were 
told that the allocations they received were based on factors 
under the decision maker's direct control. Finally, subjects in 
the final attribution condition were led to believe that the 
decision maker could not control the outcomes they’ received.
Thus, the final design was a 2 x 3 incomplete factorial with 
outcomes and attributional information as the independent 
variables (see Figure 1).
Given the design, the hypotheses are explicated in terms of 
the manipulated variables. The first hypothesis is that subjects
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Figure 1. 'Experimental Design,
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in the outcome improvement-no information condition will report 
the decision maker's allocations to be more internally caused 
(locus of causality) and controllable (locus of control) than 
subjects in the outcome constant-no information condition. By not 
providing the subject with any additional attributional 
information in the form of feedback, except what can be gleaned 
from the outcome.allocations, it is hypothesized that the outcome 
improvements would indicate that the decision maker has outcome 
control and that the initially depressed outcomes are not 
justified by contextual factors.
The ratings of both distributive and procedural fairness are 
expected to covary as a function of attributions on these 
dimensions. That is, lower perceived justice should be caused by 
perceptions that the decision maker not only has control, but that 
the basis for the allocation is an internal characteristic of the' 
decision maker. At the same time, perceptions of greater fairness 
should result from perceptions that the decision maker has less 
control and that the cause of the inequitable outcomes is 
contextually based. This difference in attributional perceptions 
is hypothesized to account for the frustration effect. The second 
and third hypotheses deal with the experimental manipulation of 
these attributions to establish their causal impact on perceptions 
of fairness.
The second hypothesis is that subjects in the outcome 
constant-controllable information condition should rate both
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procedural and distributive fairness lower than subjects in the 
outcome improvement-controllable information condition. In both 
the outcome constant and the outcome improvement conditions, the 
ratings of fairness should reflect the equity of the outcomes when 
attributions are controlled by feedback. Thus, attributional 
perceptions which are manipulated through feedback should remain 
constant in both the outcome constant and outcome improvement 
conditions resulting in perceptions of fairness that mirror the 
equity of the outcomes. Previous research has failed to control 
the variation of attributions in these two conditions.
Finally, the third hypothesis is that subjects in the outcome 
constant-uncontrollable information condition should rate 
distributive and procedural justice higher than subjects in the 
outcome constant-controllable information condition. Subjects who 
do not receive any outcome improvement- should be more willing to 
accept their unfair outcomes if they feel the decision maker does 
not have -much control over the outcome allocations.
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Method
Subjects
In exchange for extra credit toward grades in introductory 
psychology, 104 subjects were solicited from the University of 
Nebraska at Omaha. Subjects, who volunteered, were randomly 
assigned to one of five experimental conditions. Four subjects 
had to be eliminated from the experiment for one of three reasons. 
One subject did not speak English well enough to be able to follow 
the procedures as outlined. Another subject had to be eliminated 
because he chose not to make any voice statements to the decision 
maker, thus, it was impossible to provide him with any feedback 
from the manager about his voiced statement. Finally, two 
subjects stated they knew no manager existed and that they were 
being exposed to a scam. The last two subjects made these 
statements prior to debriefing, thus, their data were eliminated 
from further analyses.
Procedure
Subjects were solicited using bulletin board sign up sheets. 
At the scheduled time, subjects were placed in separate rooms 
where they were asked to read and sign a consent form. .Because 
two subjects were run at a time, each subject was escorted to a 
room as they arrived so that they were unaware that another 
subject was being run at the same time.
Subjects were informed that the purpose of the experiment was 
to assess simple cognitive performance abilities in a business
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simulation task. It was explained that these cognitive abilities 
were being measured by performance on a schedule-creating task.
The subjects were also informed that to make the business 
simulation more realistic $60.00 had been set aside from which 
they would be compensated for their work. As this did not amount 
to enough money for everyone to share, a lottery was held with 
three winners each receiving $20.00 prizes.
The subjects were informed that for each of six task 
performance sessions they would receive a certain number of 
lottery tickets. A random drawing of the tickets determined the 
three different prize winners. It was stressed that because each 
ticket had an equal probability of being selected it was to the 
advantage of each subject to have as many tickets as possible.
Subjects were led to believe that a total of twelve tickets 
were available for each task session, and that they were to be 
divided between a "manager" and "worker" as the manager saw fit.
In reality, the ticket distribution followed one of two set 
schedules outlined in Table 1. The role of manager and worker was 
also fixed, but all subjects believed that they had been randomly
selected to play the role of worker.
After the lottery, the ticket distribution process, and the 
task had been explained, subjects were asked to select one of two 
pieces of paper to determine who would play the role of manager 
and worker for the six task, sessions. The subjects were informed
that the two pieces of paper had "manager" or "worker" written on
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' Table 1 
Ticket Distribution Schedule
Trial,
Distribution
No Change 
Worker Manager
Change 
worker Manager
#1 3 9 3 9
#2 3 9 3 9
#3 3 9 3 9
#4 3 9 4 8
*5 3 9 4 8
#6 3 9 4 8 .
Total 18 54 21 51
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them to determine who played which role. Because both slips of 
paper had "worker" written on them, the subject always assumed the 
role of worker.
After the role designation had been completed, the subjects 
were given instructions for the task and asked to complete a fair 
payment card. The subjects were instructed to write on the fair 
payment card what they perceived to be a fair distribution of the 
lottery tickets. It was explained that since each person had an 
equal chance at playing either role, most people write down an 
even split as being fair.
At this point subjects were asked to begin performing the 
first of six 5-minute task performance sessions. At the 
completion of the first session, performance was documented by 
counting the number of classes that subjects had scheduled. The 
experimenter then left the room allegedly to inform the manager 
how many classes the worker had scheduled and to ascertain the 
number of tickets that the manager had allocated the worker for 
that task session. Upon returning to the room, subjects were 
informed of the number of tickets the manager had allocated to 
them for the previous task session and the number of schedules 
created by the manager. The next task performance session then 
began.
For the first session subjects were always informed that they 
had scheduled one less class than the manager; for the second 
session, one more; the third the same number as the manager; the
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fourth one more; the fifth the same; and in the last session the 
subjects were informed that they had scheduled one less class than 
the manager. All performance measurements, and information about 
the allocations were relayed to the subject in the same manner as 
was done during the first session.
Before the fourth task, performance session, subjects were 
told that in order to more closely simulate a true business 
context they were now being given an opportunity to provide 
feedback to the manager. They were told that they should write 
down on a piece of paper what they thought of the previous ticket 
allocations and what they thought would be a fair distribution in 
the future. In addition, they could also write down any other 
comments they wanted to make to the manager.
The opinions, of the subjects were then collected, and they 
were led to believe that the experimenter was going to give them 
to the manager to.read. For subjects in feedback conditions, the 
feedback from the manager was provided to them approximately five 
minutes after the opinions were collected. Following this, the 
remaining task performance sessions were completed. After the 
sixth performance session the subjects were asked to complete a 
questionnaire which assessed their perceptions of the'dependent 
variables.
Tasks
Each subject was asked to create student schedules in each of 
the six 5-minute performance sessions. For each schedule created
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it was necessary for the subject to assess the classes that a
hypothetical student still needed based on the classes that he or
she had already taken.
Subjects were provided with a series of forms containing 
information pertinent to schedules that needed to be created.
Each form contained a list of classes the student had already 
completed along with times the student had available to attend 
classes. For simplicity, subjects were informed that the forms 
had been sorted by the students' year in school, and that they 
were only going to work on schedules for students who were 
sophomores.
A separate list of the classes which each student should have
completed by the end of the sophomore year was also provided.
Combining all this information, subjects were told to write down 
on a lined piece of paper the student's identification number, 
class call number and name of the classes for which the student 
could reasonably be expected to register. Each student was to be 
scheduled for 12 to 15 hours worth of classes. The information 
about class time and dates were obtained from a copy of a 
previously used class schedule at the University. While working 
as rapidly as possible, subjects were asked to write both legibly 
and accurately insuring that there were no conflicts in the 
created schedules.
Independent Variables
Subjects were exposed to one of three responses by the
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manager to their voiced opinion, along with either a slight 
improvement or no change in outcome after voice. These conditions 
resulted in a 2 x 3 incomplete factorial design.
The three different types of responses were: no information, 
a written statement stating "you're right, but I want to keep the 
tickets for myself," or the written statement "you may be right, 
but I can't change now.” In the no information conditions subjects 
did not receive any feedback from the manager about the opinions 
they expressed. Thus, this manipulation replicates previous 
studies (e.g. Folger, 1977) of the outcome variable and was 
designed to provide ratings against which the effects of the 
attribution variable could be assessed.
In the controllable information, condition subjects received a 
message from the manager indicating that the manager acknowledges 
what the worker has pointed out is correct. Although the 
statement indicated that the manager agreed with the worker and „ 
that the manager wanted to keep the tickets, no mention of any 
outcome changes was made in this statement.
In the uncontrollable information condition subjects were 
told that the ticket outcomes could not now be changed. No 
reference to whether the manager thought the worker was right was 
made. Again, no mention of future outcomes was made, the 
statement simply addressed the opinion expressed by the worker.
In addition to the response by the manager to voice, the 
outcomes after voice were manipulated. In the no change
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condition, the proportion of the allocations the subject received 
after the expression of voice did not change. In contrast, 
subjects in the change condition received outcomes that improved 
after they voiced their opinion. The outcomes after voice were 
not a restoration of equity, but they were a moderate improvement 
over outcomes received before voice. The ticket distribution 
schedules are listed in Table 1. Because it was illogical for 
subjects to be told their outcomes could not be changed and then 
receive improvement in outcomes, this cell of the design was not 
run.
Dependent Variables
The major dependent variables were collected using a 
questionnaire following the sixth task performance session 
(Appendix A) . Along with a series of questions dealing with how 
strenuous the task was perceived to be, the subjects were asked 
how fair they thought the manager was in dividing the outcomes, 
how fair they felt the outcomes were, how much control they felt 
the manager had in deciding the outcomes, and the amount of 
consideration they felt the manager gave to their .voiced opinion. 
Each of these items was assessed using an 11-point Likert-type 
scale.
Covariate Assessment
After the experiment was run and some preliminary analysis 
had been completed, it became obvious that a large amount of 
within treatment variability existed in the data. In order to
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increase the power of the statistical analyses a suitable 
covariate was needed. Because subjects' voiced statements were 
made prior to the manipulation of the independent variables, it is 
acceptable to use information contained in the voiced statements 
as a covariate. Two of the dependent variables are procedural and 
distributive justice. Thus, assessing perceptions of fairness 
which existed at the time of voice should not only be linked to 
later perceptions of fairness, but it may also be used to factor 
out some of the within-treatment variability increasing the power 
of the statistical analyses. An acceptable method of obtaining 
these perceptions of fairness was needed.
Using the subjects' voiced statements as a source, two raters 
evaluated the amount of outcome dissatisfaction portrayed by each 
subject. This was completed using a one to five scale with one 
being the most unfair. The raters, blind to experimental 
condition, had met prior to the ratings to agree on a few loosely 
defined benchmarks, however, these ratings were primarily 
subjective evaluations. Further discussion of the covariate will 
follow in the discussion of the results.
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Results
lyianipulation Check
To determine if attributions differed as a result of the 
feedback given, subjects were asked how much the manager 
considered only his or her own interest. This question was 
designed to assess locus of causality. All subjects perceived the 
manager to consider only his or her own interests in the outcome 
allocations as is evident by the high mean values for all the 
experimental conditions (see Table 2). As anticipated, subjects 
who received the controllable information (both outcome constant 
and outcome changing conditions) perceived the manager to consider 
only his or her own interest more (M=10.13) than did subjects who 
were given the uncontrollable information (M=8.80)(using an 
11-point scale). An Analysis of Variance on these mean 
differences was significant (F(l,95)=8.89, pc.01).
Subjects were also asked how much influence they thought the 
manager had over the outcomes. This additional question was also 
intended to serve as a manipulation check by assessing perceived 
locus of control. Again, perceptions of managerial control over 
the outcomes was very high for all conditions (see Table 3). 
Subjects in the controllable information (both outcome constant 
and outcome changing) conditions perceived the manager to have 
greater control over the outcomes (M=10.30) than did those in the 
uncontrollable information condition (M=9.79). While this 
difference is in the anticipated direction, it failed to attain
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Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations of Locus of Causality (Question 15)
(To what extent did the Manager consider his or her own interest?)
Attribution Condition Outcome Condition
Constant Improvement
No Information M 9.18 8.84
(SD) (2.01) (2.01)
Controllable Information M 10.35 9.90
(SD) (0.93) (1.52)
Uncontrollable Information M. 8.80
(SD) (1.39)
note: 11-point scale where higher values indicate the manager 
considered only his or her own interest.
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Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations of Locus of Control (Question 14)
(How much influence did manager have over ticket distributions?)
Attribution Condition Outcome Condition
Constant Improvement
No Information M 10.36 10.41
(SD) (0.88) (1.15)
Controllable Information M 10.18 10.44
(SD)' (1.87) (1.28)
Uncontrollable Information M 9.79
(SD) (1.94)
note: 11-point scale where higher values indicate the manager 
had a lot of influence over the tickets.
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statistical significance (F(l,95)=1.63, n.s.). Further discussion 
of locus of control perceptions will follow.
An additional, but slightly different locus of control 
question asked subjects how much control they personally felt they
♦
had over the outcomes. This question does not directly address 
any of the stated hypotheses. An ANOVA on this question failed to 
reach statistical significance for feedback information 
(F(2,95)=1.96, n.s.), attained significance for outcome change 
(F(1,95)=5.62, p<.05), and did not reach significance for the 
interaction (F(1,95)=1.79, n.s.). The manipulation of outcome 
change resulted in subjects in the outcome improvement condition 
perceiving themselves to have greater control over their outcomes 
(M=3.08) than did subjects who received constant outcomes 
(M=2.06). However, the overall mean (M=2.47) indicates that they 
did not perceive themselves to have a great deal of control over 
their outcomes (see Table 4).
Subjects were also asked how hard they felt the manager 
worked relative to their own effort. The grand mean for all five 
conditions was M=5.64 (SD=1.04) indicating that they perceived the 
manager had expended just as much effort as they had at the task. 
Again, no specific hypotheses deal with this question. An ANOVA 
was conducted to determine if these perceptions differed by 
condition. This analysis failed to attain statistical 
significance for feedback information (F(2,95)<1, n.s.), for 
allocation amount (F(1,95)<1, n.s.), nor for their interaction
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Table 4
Means and Standard Deviations of Locus ol Control (Question 9)
(How much influence did you have over ticket outcomes?)
Attribution Condition Outcome Condition
Constant Improvement
Mo Information M 2.63 2.95
(SD) (2.76) (2.65)
Controllable Information M 1.60 3.21
(SD) (1.54) (1.93)
Uncontrollable Information. M 1.96
(SD) (1.57)
note: 11-point scale where lower values indicate very little 
influence.
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(F(1,95)<1, n.s.).
Concluding from the manipulation checks, the feedback was not 
entirely effective in altering attributions. Subjects' 
perceptions of the cause of the outcome distribution were 
successfully manipulated, but their perceptions of the amount of 
managerial control over the outcomes were not. Thus, if 
perceptions of fairness are altered by the attribution information 
about the manager, only locus of causality can be assumed to have 
caused those changes. It remains to be seen whether changes in 
locus of causality are enough to alter perceptions of fairness. 
Attributional Change
The first hypothesis was that subjects in the no information 
conditions should attribute greater responsibility for the outcome 
allocations to the manager when the outcomes change as opposed to 
when they remain the same. This should be manifested in the 
perception that the manager had greater control over and displayed 
more self-interest (locus of causality) in the outcome allocations 
when the outcomes improved only slightly.
When asked how much they felt the manager considered only his 
or her self-interest, subjects in the outcome improvement-no 
information condition perceived that the manager was slightly less 
concerned with his or her self-interest (M=8.84) than did the 
subjects in the outcome constant-no information condition 
(M=9.19). However, this difference in attributions was not
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statistically significant (F(1,95)<1, n.s.).
Subjects were asked how much control they felt the manager 
had over' the outcomes received to assess locus of control. As 
anticipated, subjects who were given outcome improvements without 
any feedback reported the manager to have greater control over the 
allocations (M=10.41) than did those who were not given any 
outcome change and did not receive any feedback (M=10.36). Again, 
however, this mean difference is not statistically significant 
(F(1,95)<1, n.s.) nor is it practically significant.
Both the locus- of control and locus of causality measures 
fail to support the first hypothesis. Demonstrating that the 
attribution model does not explain the frustration effect requires 
an assessment of whether the frustration phenomenon actually 
occurred in this study. Failure to attain a pattern of fairness 
perceptions that mirror the frustration effect would mean the 
displayed attributions may be unrelated to the phenomenon because 
it did not occur.
Distributive Justice
Eliciting the frustration effect in distributive justice 
perceptions is an important prerequisite to studying the causes of 
this phenomenon. To assess this dimension, subjects were asked 
how satisfied they were with the outcomes they received and how 
fair were the ticket distributions. The mean ratings for these 
questions are in Table 5 and Table 6. The reliability of these 
two questions was assessed using their mean within-cell
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Table 5
Means and Standard Deviations o£ Dist. Justice (Question 11)
(How satisfied are you with the number of tickets received?)
Attribution Condition 'Outcome Condition
Constant Improvement
No Information M 8.75 7.59
(SD) (2.36) (2.64)
Controllable Information M 9.23 9.00
(SD) (1.49) (2.03)
Uncontrollable Information M 7.86
(SD) (2.77)
note: 11-point scale where lower values indicate very satisfied.
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Table 6
Means and Standard Deviations of Dist. Justice (Question 19)
(How fair was the ticket distribution?)
Attribution Condition Outcome Condition
Constant Improvement
No Information M 3.15 3.39
(SD) (2.16) (1.92)
Controllable Information M 2.66 3.15
(SD) (1.59) (2.18)
uncontrollable Information M 2.74
(SD) (1.39)
note: 11-point scale where higher values indicate very fair.
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correlation. This procedure controls the variability that results 
from experimental manipulation which may artificially inflate the 
reliability coefficient. The within-cells correlation between 
these two questions was £=.59 justifying their combined use as a 
measure of distributive fairness.
The first hypothesis stated that subjects, in the outcome 
improvement-no information condition should rate satisfaction and 
fairness lower than those in the outcome constant-no information 
condition. Subjects' satisfaction with the ticket distributions 
was actually higher in the outcome improvement-no information 
condition (M=7.59) than it was in the outcome constant-no 
information condition (M=8.75)(this item is reversed scored). 
Similarly, perceptions of outcome fairness were also higher in the 
outcome improvement-no information condition (M=3.39) than they 
were in the outcome constant-no information condition (M=3.15), 
but the magnitude of this difference is very small. Thus, 
satisfaction and perceived fairness had similar while differing 
patterns of mean ratings for’these two conditions.
A MANOVA on this contrast using both the satisfaction and 
perceived outcome fairness questions failed to attain statistical 
significance (F(2,94)=1.48, n.s.). The univariate analysis for 
both satisfaction (F(1,95)=2.55, n.s.) and perceived fairness 
(F(1,95)<1, n.s.) were also, not statistically significant.
Unfortunately, the frustration effect was not elicited in the 
perceptions of distributive justice. This results in an inability
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to test an attributional explanation of the frustration phenomenon 
in this study. However, it is possible to conduct further 
analysis to determine whether perceptions of distributive fairness 
are affected by attributional information and outcome changes as 
predicted by the second and third hypothesis.
The second hypothesis was that subjects in the outcome 
constant-controllable information condition should rate procedural 
justice lower than subjects in the outcome improvement- 
controllable information condition. This hypothesis was based on 
the assumption that when attributions are controlled by the 
feedback information, the distributive justice perceptions reflect 
the equity of the allocations.
Subjects were only slightly less satisfied with the outcomes 
in the outcome constant-controllable information condition 
(M=9.23) than were subjects in the outcome improvement- 
controllable information condition (M=9.00)(again, this item is 
reversed scored). The ratings of- outcome fairness elicited the 
same pattern: subjects in the outcome constant-controllable 
information condition (M=2.66) reporting less fairness than, 
subjects in the outcome improvement-controllable information 
condition (M=3.15).
A MANOVA on these mean differences failed to reach 
significance (F(2,94)<1, n.s.). Both a univariate ANOVA on 
satisfaction (F(1,95)<1, n.s.) and on perceived fairness 
(F{1,95)<1, n.s.) also failed to attain statistical significance.
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‘I’hus, while the mean differences were consistent with the second
hypothesis, no reliable difference was found on perceptions of
distributive justice when attributions were controlled and 
*
outcomes vary.
Finally, the third hypothesis was that subjects who were not 
given any outcome changes would rate distributive justice higher 
when they were provided with uncontrollable as opposed to 
controllable information. The perception that the manager did not 
have any control over the outcomes should lead them to rate the 
outcomes as more fair.
Subjects asked about their satisfaction with the outcomes 
were more satisfied in the outcome constant-uncontrollable 
information condition (M=7.86) than were subjects in the outcome 
constant-controllable information condition (M=9.00)(again, 
reverse scored). The perceptions of outcome fairness were 
somewhat different. While subjects in the outcome constant- 
uncontrollable information condition rated outcome fairness higher 
(M=2.74) than those in the outcome constant-controllable 
information condition (M=2.66), the mean differences between these 
two conditions is not as great.
A MANOVA on the mean difference between the outcome constant- 
uncontrollable information and the outcome constant-controllable 
information conditions was statistically significant 
(F{2,94)=3.66, p<.05). While the univariate analysis of 
satisfaction reached significance (F(1,95)=3.93, p=.05) for this
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contrast, the univariate analysis of perceived outcome fairness 
did not (E(1,95)<1, n.s.). Thus, while perceptions of 
satisfaction were-influenced by the type of feedback received, 
perceptions of outcome fairness were not.
The perception of distributive fairness is not the only 
dimension on which the frustration effect manifests itself. In 
previous research (e.g. Folger-, 1977; Folger et al. , 1979), the 
perception of procedural justice has also been influenced by the 
frustration effect.
Procedural Justice
Perceptions of procedural justice were assessed by asking 
subjects how biased the manager was in the way that he or she 
distributed the tickets and to what extent the ticket allocation 
procedure favored the manager. The within-cells correlation of 
these two questions was rather low (r=.34), therefore, both will 
be assessed separately. The cell means for how biased the manager 
was are reported in Table 7, and the means for how much the 
procedures favored the manager are reported in Table .8.
Again, to support the first hypothesis the frustration effect 
should result in lower perceptions of procedural justice in the 
outcome improvement-no information condition than in the outcome 
constant-no information condition. Perceptions of bias indicated 
that subjects in the outcome improvement-no information condition 
felt the manager was less biased (M=3.90) than did subjects in the 
outcome constant-no information condition (M=2.96), opposite of
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Table 7
Means and Standard Deviation on Procedural Justice (Question 17)
(How biased was the ticket distribution procedure?)
Attribution Condition Outcome Condition
Constant Improvement
No Information M 2.96 3.90
(5D) (2.16) (2.32)
Controllable Information M 3.80 .3.41
(SD) (3.85) (2.32)
Uncontrollable Information M 4.60
(SD) (3.15)
note: 11-point scale where higher values indicate very unbiased.
Table 8
Means and Standard Deviation on Procedural Justice (Question 18)
(How much did the distribution procedure favor the manager?)
Attribution Condition Outcome Condition
Constant Improvement
Mo Information M 2.01 2.05
(SD) (1.79) (1.57)
Controllable Information M 1.46 1.81
(SD) (0.84) (1.68)
Uncontrollable Information M 2.33
(SD) (1.91)
note: 11-point scale where lower values indicate very favorable 
to the manageri
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their predicted directions. However, this mean difference failed 
to attain a statistical level of significance (F(l,95)=l.10, 
n.s.).
Measures of the extent to which the ticket procedures favored 
the manager did not reflect the same perceptions. Subjects in the 
outcome improvement-no information condition felt the procedures 
favored the manager less (M=2.Q5) than did subjects in the outcome 
constant-no information condition (M=2.01). However, these are 
not practically significant differences and they also fail to 
attain statistical significance (F(1,95)<1, n.s.). Thus, neither 
question related to perceptions of fairness support the first 
hypothesis.
The second hypothesis, that procedural fairness should be 
influenced by the outcomes when attributions were controlled, also 
failed to receive any support from the measures of procedural 
fairness. More bias was reported by subjects in the outcome 
improvement-controllable information condition (M=3.41) than 
subjects in the outcome constant-controllable information 
condition (M=3.80). This result is opposite to that which was 
predicted, but it failed to reach statistical significance 
(F(1,95)<1, n.s.). Subjects also felt that the procedures favored 
the manager more in the outcome constant-controllable information 
condition (M=1.46) than in the outcome improvement-controllable 
information condition (M=1.81). This result is also opposite to 
that which was predicted, and it also failed to reach statistical
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significance (F(l,95)<1, n.s.).
To determine whether any support existed for the third 
hypothesis, mean differences between the outcome constant- 
controllable information and outcome constant-uncontrollable 
information conditions were studied. Subjects in the outcome 
constant-controllable information condition perceived the manager 
to be more biased (M=3.80) than did the subjects in the outcome 
improvement-uncontrollable information condition (M=4.60j. This 
difference, while in the anticipated direction, was not 
statistically significant (F(1,95)<1, n.s.). Subjects also felt 
‘chat, the procedures favored the manager more in the outcome 
constant-controllable information condition (M=1.46) than in the 
outcome constant-uncontrollable information condition (M=2.33). 
Again, the means are as predicted but they failed to reach a level 
of statistical significance (F(1,95)=2.90, n.s.). Thus, the third 
hypothesis also fails to receive any support in perceptions of 
procedural fairness.
Subjects were asked to answer one additional question dealing 
■with procedural justice. This question, however, asked subjects 
their perception of how fair it was to allow the manager to decide 
how many tickets the worker received. In general, subjects felt 
that this procedure was neither fair nor unfair as evidenced by 
M=5.82 (SD=2.92)V This question deals with a different type of 
procedural justice, one not under the manager's control. None of 
the hypotheses deal specifically with this question. Again, a
58
factorial ANOVA was used in the analysis. This analysis failed to 
reach significance for feedback information (F(2,95)<1, n.s.), for 
outcome change (F(1,95)<1, n.s.), and their interaction 
(F(1,95)<1, n.s.).
while perceptions of distributive and procedural fairness are 
the most predominantly utilized measures in the frustration effect 
research (e.g. deCarufel & Schopler, 1979; Folger, 1977, Folger et 
al., 1979), Conlon et al. (1989) recently demonstrated that 
perceptions of due consideration also manifest the frustration 
effect pattern. With this in mind, the subjects' perceptions of 
whether they were given due consideration were also assessed in 
this study.
Due Consideration
Perceptions of due consideration were assessed by asking 
subjects how considerate and how understanding was the manager.
The within-cells correlation between these two measures was r=.63 
justifying their combined use in MANOVA. The means for the 
consideration question are reported in Table 9 and the means for 
the understanding question are reported in Table 10.
If the first hypothesis were extended to due consideration, 
it would predict a drop in due consideration in the outcome 
improvement-no information condition as compared to the outcome 
constant-no information condition. Just the opposite pattern was 
manifested for both questions. Subjects in the outcome 
improvement-no information condition perceived the manager to be
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Table 9
Means and Standard Deviations for Due Consideration (Question 8)
(How considerate was the manager?)
Attribution Condition Outcome Condition
Constant Improvement
No Information M 3.21 4.13
(SD) (2.18) (1.66)
Controllable Information M 2.77 3.21
(SD) (1.53) (1.60)
Uncontrollable Information M 3.42
(SD) (1.86)
*
note: 11-point scale where higher values indicate very 
considerate.
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Table 10
Means and Standard Deviations for Due Consideration (Question 12)
(How understanding was the manager?)
Attribution Condition Outcome Condition
Constant Improvement
No Information m ' 3.34 4.53
(SD) (1.98) (2.02)
Controllable Information M 3.03 3.70
(SD) (2.20) (2.34)
Uncontrollable Information M 3.54
(SD) (2.20)
note: 11-point scale where higher values indicate very
understanding
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more considerate (14=4.13) than subjects in the outcome constant-no 
•information condition (M=3.21). The manager was also perceived to 
be more understanding in the outcome improvement-no information 
condition (M=4.53) than in the outcome constant-no information 
condition (M=3.34). These mean differences failed to reach a 
statistically significant level when analyzed using MANOVA 
(F(2,94)=1.69, n.s.). Both the univariate analysis for 
consideration (F{1 ,95)=2.63, n.s.) and understanding 
(F(1,95)=3.04, n.s.) also failed to reach significance.
Extending the second hypothesis to due consideration would 
result in the prediction that subjects in the controllable 
information conditions would rate consideration higher if they 
were provided outcome improvements as opposed to no outcome 
change. Consistent with this prediction subjects perceived the 
manager to be more considerate in the outcome improvement- 
controllable information condition (M=3.21) than in the outcome 
constant-controllable information condition (M=2.78). This same 
pattern exists in perceptions of managerial understanding with the 
outcome improvement-controllable information condition resulting 
in higher ratings (M=3.70) than the outcome constant-controllable 
information condition (M=3.03). An ANOVA on these mean 
differences failed to be statistically significant at the 
multivariate level (F(2,94)<1, n.s.) and both univariate levels 
for consideration (F(1,95)<1, n.s.) and understanding (F(1,95)<1, 
n.s.). Again, perceptions of due consideration are not supportive
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of the second hypothesis.
Finally, the third hypothesis would predict that due 
consideration would be higher with the uncontrollable information 
feedback than with the controllable information feedback when the 
outcomes did not change. Both perceived consideration and 
understanding were consistent with this hypothesis. However, 
subjects in the outcome constant-controllable information 
condition rated consideration only slightly lower (M=2.78) than 
those in the outcome constant-uncontrollable information condition 
(M=3.43). Likewise, managerial understanding was perceived to be 
only slightly lower in the outcome constant-controllable 
information condition (M=3.03) than in the outcome constant- 
uncontrollable information condition (M=3.54).
Again, the multivariate analysis failed to reach statistical 
significance (F(2,95)<1, n.s.). The univariate analysis also 
failed to reach statistical significance for both the 
consideration question (F(1,95)<1, n.s.) and the understanding 
question (F(1,95)<1, n.s.).
One additional question assessed how much subjects felt the 
manager listened to what they had to say. This question is 
different than the other two due consideration questions in that 
the question merely asks whether the manager listened to what was 
said rather than how much it was considered. Thus, an ANOVA was 
used in the analysis rather than specific, planned comparisons.
In this analysis the effect for feedback was not significant
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(F(2,95)<1, n.s.)/ the main effect for outcome change was 
significant (F(l,95)=4.49, p<.05),-and the interaction was not 
(F(1,95)=2.91, n.s.). Subjects in the outcome improvement 
conditions reported that the manager listened to them more 
(M=4.13) than did.subjects in the outcome constant conditions 
(M=2.23). Again, the overall mean (M=2.99) indicates.that the 
manager did not listen a lot to what was said (see Table 11). 
However, subjects provided with improving outcomes did feel the . 
manager listened to them more.
In summary, while the perceptions of managerial consideration 
and understanding were not affected by the manipulations, 
perceptions of . how much the manager listened was .altered by 
outcome improvements but not by the type of feedback information 
provided.
Analysis of Covariance
As noted before, a high level of within-treatment variability 
exists which reduces the power of the statistical analysis. In an 
effort to remove some of this variance, an analysis of covariance 
was utilized.. The covariate was computed from two independent 
raters' evaluations of how unfairly the subject felt that he or 
she was treated in the three initial allocations. These ratings 
.•■/ere based on each subjects' voiced statements.
Each subjects' voiced statements were rated on a 1 to 5 
scale, where 1 is the most unfair. Rater #1 had a mean rating of 
3.64 and a standard deviation of 1.02 across subjects while rater
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Table 11
Weans and standard Deviations for Due Consideration (Question 10)
(How much did the manager listen?)
Attribution Condition Outcome Condition
Constant Improvement
No Information M 1.53 4.60
(SD) (1.71) (2.34)
Controllable Information M 2.21 3.65
(SD) (1.77) (2.66)
Uncontrollable Information M 2.94
(SD) (2.10)
note: 11-point scale where higher values indicate listened a lot
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u2 had a mean rating of 2.87 and a standard deviation of 1.02.
The .inter-rater reliability coefficient was r=.54. In order to 
give equal weighting to each raters' evaluations, each rater's 
rating was standardized across subjects and then the mean of the 
two standardized ratings for each subject was computed. The mean 
of the standardized rating then served as the covariate.
Stevens (1986, p. 298) points out three prerequisites to the 
appropriate use of an Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA). First, the 
covariate itself must not be affected by the manipulation of the 
independent variables. In this particular experiment, the 
independent variables were never administered until after the 
subjects voiced their opinions. Because ratings of subject's 
voiced statements were used as the covariate, it was impossible 
for the covariate to be affected by experimental condition; thus, 
this assumption is-satisfied.
Second, the covariate must be linearly related to the 
dependent variable. To ascertain whether this assumption is met 
requires regressing each dependent variable on the covariate while 
controlling for experimental condition. The within-cells 
regression equation is then tested for its significance indicating 
whether the covariate and the dependent variables.are linearly 
related. If a linear relationship exists, the second assumption 
is satisfied.
Third, the regression of the dependent variables on the 
covariate must be the same for each treatment condition. In order
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to ascertain whether this assumption is met, Stevens recommends 
the independent variabie-covariate interaction term .be assessed 
for its significance on the dependent variable. If the 
interaction analysis turns out to be significant, this assumption 
has not been met. Failure to attain significance results in 
sufficiently satisfying this, requirement.
The second and third assumption require testing for each of 
the dependent variables analyzed. Only procedural and 
distributive justice perceptions are theoretically linked to the 
covariate. Thus, only these two variables can be analyzed with 
the ANCOVA procedure, assuming the other requirements have been 
met.
Distributive Justice
Testing the second assumption of ANCOVA, the multivariate 
within-ceils regression equation was significant (F(2,93)=9.84, 
pc.001). In addition, the univariate regression equation was 
significant for both the satisfaction (F(2,93)=7.58, p<.01) and 
the perceived fairness question (F(2,93)=19.75, pc.001). Thus, a 
linear relationship between the covariate and the dependent 
variables has been established.
A multivariate assessment of the interaction of the 
independent variable and the covariate on the dependent variables 
failed to obtain significance (F(8,178)<1, n.s.). The univariate 
analyses of the interaction terms were also non-significant for 
both the satisfaction (F(4,90)=1.02, n.s.) and the fairness
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question (F(4,90)<1, n.s.). Based on the criteria established by 
Stevens, the regression equations for each condition are similar.
The MANCOVA analysis testing the significance between the 
outcome improvement-no information condition and the outcome 
constant-no information condition still failed to attain 
statistical significance (F(2,93)=1.45, n.s.). This test of the 
first hypothesis resulted in no change with the use of the more 
powerful statistical approach.
A MANCOVA testing the difference between the outcome constant 
and outcome improvement conditions when controllable feedback 
information was given also failed to attain significance 
(F(2,93)<1, n.s.). Thus, the second hypothesis is not supported 
even when the more powerful MANCOVA procedure is used to analyze 
the data.
Finally, for subjects given constant outcomes, a MANCOVA 
between those given the controllable feedback and those given the 
uncontrollable feedback failed to attain statistical significance 
(F(2,93)=2.39, n.s.). The third hypothesis also fails to be 
supported with MANCOVA, however, it was supported with the 
straight ANOVA procedure. Given the different outcomes, a 
decision was made to stick with the MANCOVA results in that it 
adjusts for pre-treatment group differences which may have 
erroneously inflated the significance of the straight ANOVA. If 
pre-treatment differences existed between the two groups, it would 
be more appropriate to use the MANCOVA approach to assess the real
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effects of the manipulations.
in conclusion, the assessment of each of the hypotheses is 
not supported using the MANCOVA procedure in the analysis of 
distributive justice.
Procedural Justice
Procedural justice was assessed with two separate questions. 
The test of the within-cells regression equation for the question 
of how biased the manager was in the way he or she distributed 
tickets failed to attain statistical significance (F(1,94)=2.02, 
n.s.). Thus, it would be inappropriate to use the. ANCOVA 
procedure on the analysis of this question.
The regression of the dependent variable on the covariate for 
the question which asked how much the ticket distribution favored 
the manager was significant (F(l,94)=9.98, p<.01). As a result, 
the second assumption of ANCOVA was met for this covariate.
The interaction between treatment condition and covariate on 
the dependent variable was assessed to test the third 
prerequisite. This interaction failed to reach significance 
(F(4.90)<1, n.s.). Thus, both prerequisites were satisfied.
Again, a test was conducted of the mean differences between 
subjects in the outcome constant-no information condition and the 
outcome improvement-no information condition. This analysis 
failed to reach statistical significance (F(1,94)<1, n.s.), thus 
hypothesis one remains unsupported.
The second hypothesis was tested by contrasting the means
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between those who received outcomes that improved and those that 
had outcomes that remained the same when the controllable feedback 
information was given. This analysis also failed to reach 
significance (F(1,94)<1, n.s.) which results in hypothesis two not 
receiving any support.
An ANCOVA testing the effects of the controllable information 
as opposed to the uncontrollable information when outcome are 
constant also failed to'attain significance (F(l,94)=2.60, n.s.). 
Again, the conclusions surrounding the third hypothesis do not 
change as a result of the ANCOVA procedure.
In summary, the results of the procedural justice questions 
using an ANCOVA procedure do not result in any substantive changes 
regarding each of the hypotheses. All of the analyses failed to 
statistically support the hypotheses.
Summary of Results
The manipulations were only partially effective at altering 
attributions. Specifically, perceptions of locus of causality 
were effectively manipulated while perceptions of managerial 
control over the outcomes were not significantly altered.
However, the manager was perceived to have a great deal of control 
over the outcomes and to consider only his or her own interest in 
all conditions. Subjects perceived they had little control over 
the outcome even though some increased personal control was noted 
when the outcomes improved.
Unfortunately, perceptions of both procedural and
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distributive justice were not systematically affected by the 
experimental manipulations. -In all conditions subjects felt the 
outcomes were both procedurally and distributively unfair as 
evidenced by extremely low ratings on these dimensions.
In addition, the perceptions of managerial consideration and 
understanding were not affected by the experimental condition.
The perceptions of how much the manager listened was affected by 
the improvement in outcomes with those receiving outcome 
improvements reporting the manager to have listened more than 
those whose outcomes did not change. .
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Discussion
The present study attempted to explain the frustration effect 
using an attribution model of achievement motivation and emotion 
(Weiner, 1985). The frustration effect is defined as a decrease 
in perceptions of fairness that accompany an increase in outcomes 
when the outcome increase is small.
As proposed by Lind and Tyler (1988), this study supported 
their statement that the frustration effect is indeed a fragile 
phenomenon. Subjects who received inequitable outcome 
distributions rated procedural and distributive fairness in a 
positive monotonic fashion with the objective outcome equity.
Even though this rating pattern did not attain statistical 
significance, this pattern is inconsistent with previous studies 
of the frustration effect where subjects who received increased 
outcomes rated fairness lower than those whose outcomes were more 
objectively inequitable (e.g. Conlon et al., 1989; Folger, 1977; 
Folger et al., 1979). Unfortunately, these results also limit 
further understanding of the cognitive processes that lead to the 
frustration phenomenon.
Essential to the investigation of the frustration effect was 
lower ratings of fairness by subjects receiving outcome 
improvement compared to those receiving no outcome change after 
voice. Although this particular effect is merely a replication of 
previous research, the pattern of ratings in this study did not 
conform to earlier findings. In this study subjects initially
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received 3 out of 12 tickets (the manager keeping 9) which changed 
to 4 out of 12 (the manager keeping 8) for those given a slight 
outcome improvement. Apparently, this was perceived by the 
subjects to be more than a token improvement as evidenced by the 
associated rise in fairness ratings.
Lind, and Tyler (1988), while acknowledging the effect is 
uncommon, stated the frustration phenomenon is important because 
it is inconsistent with theoretical models of procedural justice. 
The fact that neither equity theory nor models of procedural 
justice are consistent with this phenomenon makes it a likely 
candidate for more detailed investigation in order to delineate 
the psychological mechanisms responsible for the unusual effect. 
Unfortunately, this study confirmed that the frustration effect 
may only occur under a unique set of circumstances.
One problem associated with this study may .revolve around 
trying to ascertain the specific aspects of fairness that are of 
interest. Asking subjects about the fairness of the ticket 
distribution may result in the assessment of different aspects of 
fairness depending on how people interpret the question. It may 
not be enough, as was done in this study, to ask how fair were the 
ticket distributions. More specific questions would be needed to 
make sure all subjects were thinking about the same thing.
In light of the fact that the frustration effect did not 
occur, an analysis of the subjects' attributions takes on less 
significance. Nonetheless, attributional change as a function of
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outcome change was analyzed. Unfortunately, attributions were not 
significantly affected by the subjects' outcomes in the absence of 
feedback. Subjects who received outcomes that changed perceived 
the manager as having more control over the outcomes, but this 
change was not statistically significant.
In examining the mean differences in the two no-feedback 
information cells on locus of control, the possibility of ceiling 
effects is evident. Given the fact that perceptions were so 
polarized on this dimension, it would be difficult to distinguish 
between perceptions of managerial control of the outcomes even if 
they did exist. An attempt was made to overcome this problem with 
the use of an 11-point as opposed to a 7-point Likert-type scale.
The polarization of scores is also a problem elsewhere in 
this experiment. Even though subjects were asked to answer 
questions on an 11-point scale, only one-half of this scale was 
essentially being used. All subjects were in situations where 
they had been dealt with unfairly, therefore, only the unfair 
portion of the scale was used making it difficult to examine, 
differences if they did occur.
Another requirement of studying the frustration effect is the 
successful manipulation of attributions through feedback. .It is 
questionable whether or not this was accomplished in this 
particular study. As evidenced in the manipulation checks, 
feedback statements were not as effective at manipulating the 
subjects' perceptions of locus of control as they were at
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manipulating perceptions of locus of causality. It appears 
subjects' perceptions of what caused the manager to act the way he 
or she did was manipulated while perceptions of the manager's 
control over the outcome decision was not.
Because each subject was initially told the manager had total 
control over the worker's outcomes, it is possible these 
perceptions were not open to further manipulation. If this were 
the case, then measures of locus of control would not change while 
measures of locus of causality would still be open to vary as a 
function of the type of feedback subjects were given. This 
explanation is also consistent with the "ceiling effect" noted on 
the locus of control question that assessed manager control.
The validity of the above argument is somewhat weakened by 
the fact that the locus of control question was not written with 
as many anchors as was the locus of causality question. In other 
words, if there were no real differences between locus of 
causality and locus of control, it may have been difficult to get 
parallel results to these two dimensions given the varying number 
of anchors used on the two types of questions.' One of the things 
that has become clear is that future studies of the frustration 
phenomenon, which by their very nature deal with only half of the 
attribution and fairness scale, must use many carefully devised 
anchors in order to make reliable psychological assessments of the 
constructs of interest.
On closer examination, the two questions that deal with
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distributive justice ("How satisfied were you with the,number of 
tickets you received?" and "How fair was the ticket
distribution?") fail to reflect the same pattern of mean
differences. Satisfaction improved with the provision of feedback
which gave an external justification for the inequitable outcomes.
However, perceptions of fairness were not affected by the type of 
feedback subjects were given. Previous studies (e.g. Folger,
1977) have found that satisfaction and fairness perceptions lead 
to similar results. In this study, however, it is possible 
subjects rated satisfaction based on their subjective experience 
of the outcomes and rated fairness more on the objective features 
of the outcomes independent of their subjective experience.
This explanation is consistent with the mean differences 
between treatment conditions in this study. Subjects rated the 
distributive fairness question in a manner which was parallel to 
the actual equity of the outcomes. In contrast, their 
satisfaction with the outcomes revealed a different pattern of 
ratings. Satisfaction, for those provided with feedback, was 
consistent with the types of attributions subjects made.
Another problem plaguing this experiment was the high degree 
of within subjects variability on many of the questions. While 
certainly some of the variability can be attributed to measurement 
weaknesses, some have recently suggested individual differences 
exist in perceptions of fairness (Huseman, Hatfield, & Miles, 
1987). The argument is that people differ in their sensitivity to
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fairness perceptions. Three types of people exist: Benevolents, 
who prefer their outcome ./'input ratio to he less than that of a 
comparison other; Equity Sensitives, who prefer their 
outcome/input ratio to be equal to a comparison other; and, 
Entitleds who prefer their outcome/input ratio to exceed that of a 
comparison other. Unfortunately, there is no systematic empirical 
research to back up this construct, and more research needs to 
address this issue if justice research is to be productive. If 
individual differences do exist, it will be necessary to 
methodologically or statistically control these differences in 
future research.
It should also be noted that studies of the frustration 
phenomenon have only been done in a lab setting. As of yet, it is 
not clear whether the frustration effect actually occurs in the 
real world. It may be the lab provides such tight control over 
extraneous variables that the frustration effect can be evoked.
The lack of these artificial controls in natural settings may 
result in the absence of the frustration phenomenon. More 
research needs to address how prevalent the frustration effect is 
in real life.
Analysis of the frustration effect remains incomplete. This 
study was not decisive in developing an understanding of the 
variables that lead to this perplexing phenomenon. While it has 
been clearly established that the frustration effect occurs only 
under a unique set of circumstances, research needs to delineate
77
exactly what factors lead to a decrease in satisfaction when 
improvements in distributions and procedures are made.
Once this is accomplished, then a more thorough understanding 
of the generality of equity theory and models of procedural 
justice can be entertained. Until this is accomplished, the 
frustration effect will remain an anomaly that lies outside our 
present explanations of perceptions of fairness.
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Appendix A
COGNITIVE PERFORMANCE IN A BUSINESS SIMULATION
Please answer the following questions based on the 
experiment in which you just participated. Be sure 
to follow the directions closely. Answer each 
q u e s tio n  t r u th fu lly .  {Please circle the number 
that best describes your perception.)
The following question address your reactions tQ...the task,
1. How difficult was it for you to create schedules?
Extremely Very Somewhat Somewhat Very Extremely
Easy Easy Easy Neither Difficult Difficult Difficult
1....... T ......... i , | r ... - 1 1 r 1 I
1 2 3  4  5  6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1
2. To what extent did you have to concentrate to complete the task?
Not A
at all Somewhat Lot
I 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 i I
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1
3. How much did you rely on the scratch paper?
Not A
at all Somewhat - Lot
I i i i i I 1 1 1 I I
1 2  3  4  5  6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1
4. How much did you rely on your memory?
Not A
at all Some Lot
I 1 i T  I I 1 1 1 1 I
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1
5. How much effort did you put into being accurate?
None A
at all Some Lot
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1
... ,
1 2 3  4 5  6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1
6. How much effort did you put into being fast?
None 
at ail Some
A
Lot
1 1 I I I I I I I I ~ I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9 1 0  1 1
7. How drained (tired) did you feel as a result of making schedules?
Extremely Very Somewhat A Little Not at'all
Tired Tired Tired Tired Tired
I I I I I I I I I I I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8  9 1  0  1 1
S T O P !
IF YOU WERE THE MANAGER, PLEASE SKIP QUESTIONS 8 THROUGH 
19 AND ANSWER QUESTIONS 20 THROUGH 31. 
IF YOU WERE THE WORKER, PLEASE ANSWER QUESTIONS 8 
THROUGH 19 AND SKIP QUESTIONS 20 THROUGH 31.
8. How considerate was the manager?
Extremely Quite 
Inconsiderate Inconsiderate Neither
Quite
Considerate
Extremely
Considerate
I I I l I I I I I I i
1 2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0  1 1
9. How much influence did you feel you had over the number of tickets you received?
None A Great
at all Some Deal
r ........ i .......i i I I I I I i i
1 2  3  4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0  1 1
10. How much did the manager listen to what you had to say?
None A Great
at all Some Deal
i i .... i“  " i I I I I I i i
1 2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0  1 1
11. How satisfied were you with the number of tickets your received?
Extremely Very Somewhat Somewhat Very Extremely
Satisfied Satisfied . Satisfied Neither Dissatisfied Dissatisfied Dissatisfied
i 1----1---- i— “ i--- 1---- i----i----1-  i n
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1
The following question deal with vour perceptions of the manager
12. How understanding was the manager?
Not Somewhat not Somewhat Very
at ali Understanding Neither Understanding Understanding
I I I I I i I I I I I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0  1 1
13. How hard do you think the manager worked?
Much less A iittle As hard A little Much more
than you less than you as you more than you than you
1 T " 'I ...I ' ' I 1 1 1 1 t 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1
14. How much influence did you feel that the manager had over the number
of tickets you received?
None A Great
at all Some Deal
I 1 I I I 1 1 1 I I I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 1
15. How much did you feel the manager considered only his or her own interest?
Not Very Quite Very Extremely
at all little Somewhat Moderately a bit much so so
1 1 i I I i i ' 1 I I I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1
The following questions deal with how fair vou were treated in this 
experiment,
16. How fair was it to let the manager decide how many tickets you 
received?
Extremely Very Somewhat Somewhat Very Extremely
Unfair Unfair Unfair Neither Fair Fair Fair
i i i i i n r  ~ 1 i i i n
1 2  3 4  5 6 7  8  9 1 0 1 1
17. How biased was the manager in the way that he or she distributed the tickets?
Extremely Very Somewhat Somewhat Very Extremely
biased biased biased Neither unbiased unbiased unbiased
I i i i i i i “ i i i i
1 2 3 4  5  6 7  8  9 1 0 1 1
18. Indicate the extent to which you feel the ticket distribution procedures favored you, the 
manager, or neither of you?
It favored 
the manager
Somewhat 
the manager
It favored 
neither
Somewhat
you
It favored 
you
I I I 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 I
1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1
19. How fair was the ticket distribution?
Extremely Very Somewhat Somewhat Very Extremely
Unfair Unfair Unfair Neither Fair Fair Fair
1 2 3 4 5  6 7  8  9 1 0 1 1
IF YOU WERE THE WORKER STOP HERE! 
IF YOU WERE THE MANAGER START HERE!
20. How considerate was the worker?
Extremely Quite Quite Extremely
Inconsiderate Inconsiderate Neither Considerate Considerate
l I l I 1- - - - 1 1 '— I- - - - 1- - - - 1- - - - 1
1 2  3 4 5  6 7  8  9 1 0 1 1
21. How much influence did you feel you had over the number of tickets you received?
None A Great
at all Some Deal
I I ...  I I I 1 I I I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9
I
1 0
n
1 1
22. How much did the worker listen to what you had to say?
None
at all Some
A Great 
Deal
i i i i i i i i  i
1 2  3 4 5  6 7  8  9
I
1 0
I.
1 1
23. How satisfied were you with the number of tickets your received?
Extremely Very Somewhat Somewhat Very Extremely 
Satisfied Satisfied Satisfied Neither Dissatisfied Dissatisfied Dissatisfied
I 1... 1 ........."1 "  I I 1 I 1 1 1
1 2 3 4 5  6 7  8 9 1 0 1 1
The  fol lowina Question deal  with vour DerceDtions of the worker.
24. How understanding was the worker?
Not Somewhat not Somewhat 
at all Understanding Neither Understanding
Very
Understanding
i j , | , i i i  ■■■■ i
1 2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I
1 o
I
1 1
25. Do you feel the worker worked harder, as hard as, or more than you?
Much less A little As hard A little 
than you less than you as you more than you
Much more 
than you
I l i i i i 1 ...  i i
1 2 3 4  5  6 7  8  9
i
1 0
i
1 1
26. How much influence did you feel that the worker had over the number 
of tickets you received?
None
at all Some
A Great 
Deal
I I I I I I I l l l l
1 2 3 „ 4 5 6 7  8  9 1 0 1 1
27. How much did you feel the worker considered only his or her own interest?
None 
at all Some
A Great 
Deal
i i I I I I I 1 "1 1 I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1
Thfi fn llo w irm  Q u e s tio n s  deal with how fair vou were trea ted in this
e x p e r im e n t ,
28. How fair was it to let you decide how many tickets you
received?
Extremely Very Somewhat Somewhat Very Extremely
Unfair Unfair Unfair Neither Fair Fair Fair
i i I I I I I I 1 i I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1
29. How impartial were you in the way that you distributed the tickets?
Extremely Very Somewhat Somewhat Very Extremely
biased biased biased Neither unbiased unbiased unbiased
I I I I I I I 1 1 I I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1
30. Indicate the extent to which you feel the ticket distribution procedures favored you, the
worker, or neither of you?
It favored Somewhat It favored Somewhat It favored
the worker the worker neither you you
I I I i " I I I 1 1 I I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1
31, How fair was the ticket distribution?
Extremely Very Somewhat Somewhat Very Extremely
Unfair Unfair Unfair Neither Fair Fair Fair •
1 1 I I I i i 1 1 I I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1
